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jgh living standards depend critically
on many types of infrastructure—bom
technological and institutional — that few
fully comprehend. The payments system,
the means by which funds are transferred
between economic agents, is one such
critical support.
The importance of technology in the
payments system is undeniable, but
technology is not enough to ensure that
a payment instrument will be widely
accepted. For example, the basic tech-
nology for financial electronic data
interchange — high-speed electronic
communications and computers — has
been around for at least 20 years, but
the institutional arrangements between
those with access to this technology
and their banks are still lacking.
Today's advanced economies could not
function without an efficient payments
system that, from the viewpoint of the
user, can handle transactions through-
out the world almost as easily as across
the street. Modern business organiza-
tions could not flourish with anything
less. The production of everything from
automobiles to the new financial de-
rivative instruments requires coordinat-
ing people and capital across regions to
ensure that all parties will be paid for
their services in a timely manner.
This Economic Commentary outlines
the evolution of the U.S. payments sys-
tem, with particular emphasis on the
role played by the Federal Reserve. Af-
ter examining exactly what the pay-
ments system is and how it functions,
I present some of the technological and
institutional challenges confronting the
current system.
• Payments System Evolution
Describing how the payments system has
developed over time illustrates how it de-
pends crucially on both technology and
economic institutions. Although no writ-
ten record exists, the first exchanges must
have been barter transactions. Baiter re-
quires locating someone who not only has
the goods or services you want, but is
also willing to take your items or services
in exchange. These high search costs,
plus the time spent haggling over the ex-
change rate for your goods relative to his,
makes barter an expensive proposition.
A poorly functioning payments system
can impose two types of losses on an
economy. First, resources employed in
completing transactions (time in a bar-
ter economy) are unavailable for other
uses, resulting in reduced output of ad-
ditional goods and services. Second, to
the extent that transactions are costly,
there may be less specialization of la-
bor and capital than is desirable.
One of the first innovations in the pay-
ments system was settling on a common
medium of exchange, such as precious
metals or, in colonial Virginia, tobacco. A
common exchange medium lowers search
and haggling costs because now, all that
matters is the price of an item or service
in terms of the medium chosen. The
seller can use the proceeds to purchase
whatever he desires.
Today's complex, worldwide economic
network is more dependent than ever
on a safe and efficient payments sys-
tem, yet few are aware of how it func-
tions. This article defines the U.S.
payments system, outlines its evolution,
and examines some of the areas where
improvements are needed.

























































a. In 1992, wire transfers accounted for approximately 95 percent of all dollars exchanged in trade, but fewer than 0.03 percent of all transactions.
SOURCES: David B. Humphrey and Allen N. Berger, "Market Failure and Resource Use: Economic Incentives to Use Different Payment Instruments." in David B.
Humphrey, ed.. The US. Payments System: Efficiency. Kisk. and the Role of the Federal Resene. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1990, pp. 45 - 86: and Bank for
International Settlements, Payment Systems in the Group of Ten Countries, Basle: BIS, December 1993, pp. 469-70.
Precious metals were first used as a me-
dium of exchange around 2500 B.C. in
Mesopotamia. Their enduring popular-
ity is based on the fact that they are
nonperishable, easily recognizable, and
small amounts generally command a
large quantity of other goods.
Coins stamped from precious metals,
which date back to 700 B.C., repre-
sented a significant advance over non-
uniform pieces of metal because of
their convenient form and their stan-
dardized sizes and metal content. Gen-
erally, the face value of a coin exceeds
the worth of the metal it contains. Over
time, this difference — known as sei-
gniorage — has been a reliable source
of revenue for mints, which tend to be
government monopolies. People are
generally more than willing to pay a
small seigniorage fee for the conven-
ience of carrying coins. An even larger
amount of seigniorage can be extracted
when the law requires that coins be ac-
cepted as payment for debts regardless
of their actual precious metal content.
Paper money, which is backed by either
precious metals or the compulsory power
of the state, developed in eleventh century
China. Paper represented another vast im-
provement in payments system efficiency
because it requires relatively few resources
to produce and is less costly than bullion
or coins to transport To work, however,
people must have faith in the authority is-
suing the currency, since low production
costs also mean that paper money is rela-
tively easy to debase by printing too
much, eroding its ability to act as a store
of value. Another problem is that the offi-
cial engravers must stay at least one step
ahead of the counterfeiters.
Acceptance of paper money requires
not only the technology to produce a se-
cure currency, but also institutions that
inspire public confidence. A hapless
thirteenth century Persian court advisor
discovered the hard way what happens
when the technology is in place but the
institutions are not. Rather than accept
the newly decreed paper money, mer-
chants closed their shops and hid their
wares. To defuse the resulting economic
crisis, the paper currency was with-
drawn and the official responsible was
torn to pieces in the bazaar.' Perhaps
this helps to explain why central bankers
have become such a conservative lot.
trict, the payments system has under-
gone most of these same innovations.
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Two hundred years ago, a local mer-
chant wanting to buy goods from Al-
bany, New York would probably have
sent an agent bearing other wares —
paper money, coins, and precious met-
als being scarce on the frontier — to
make the purchase, a time-consuming
and hazardous process.
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A hundred years ago, the procedure
would have been much easier and less
costly. The buyer could place his order
by mail or telegraph and then arrange
for his local bank to handle the pay-
ment. The banker would face the cum-
bersome task of finding an institution
in Albany that was part of a common
clearinghouse, probably in New York
City. After debiting the customer's
account, the local bank would wire the
New York clearinghouse and direct it
to transfer the funds from its own ac-
count to that of the Albany bank. The
Albany bank would in turn pay the sup-
plier. This process, though much im-
proved, was still expensive. The cus-
tomer would probably even be charged
for changing Cleveland dollars to New
York dollars. Incredible as it may seem
today, newspapers at the time published
tables of domestic exchange rates.
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Within the territory that ultimately be-
came the Fourth Federal Reserve Dis-• The Payments System Today
The same transaction can now be com-
pleted by phone, fax, or E-mail, and
the payment can be made by any of
five types of nonelectronic instruments
(cash, checks, credit cards, traveler's
checks, or money orders) or by four
types of electronic instruments (auto-
mated clearinghouse [ACH], wire trans-
fer, point of sale, or automated teller
machine [ATM]). For the user of these
services, the transaction is relatively
painless unless something goes awry,
such as a check being returned for in-
sufficient funds. Each of these instru-
ments has different production and
processing costs, is subject to varying
amounts of float (the time between a
payor liquidating his obligation and the
payee receiving use of the funds), and
offers the user different levels of con-
venience and security.
When vast amounts of money must be
moved, wire transfers (Fedwire and the
private Clearing House Interbank Pay-
ment System, or CHIPS) are overwhelm-
ingly the preferred means of payment be-
cause the funds are available almost
immediately. In the United States, wire
transfers accounted for more than 80 per-
cent of the dollars exchanged in trade in
1987, but comprised only 0.03 percent of
all transactions (see table I).
5 Most trans-
actions are conducted using cash (83 per-
cent) or checks (14 percent), but the dol-
lar amounts tend to be small. As more
businesses and individuals become accus-
tomed to paying their bills electronically,
the already strong double-digit annual
growth in the use of these payment instru-
ments should surge.
The last two columns of table 1 present
estimates of the cost per item of vari-
ous payment instruments. Payor cost is
the net expense incurred by a user of a
payment service. From this perspective,
cash and checks are the least costly al-
ternatives. In fact, checks on average
generate a 4-cent benefit to the user.
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Of course, there is no such thing as a
free lunch, and in this case, it is the payee
who loses. The delay in accessing the
funds is a benefit to the payor (who can
earn interest on the float) that just equals
the cost to the payee (who loses the op-
portunity to earn interest on the funds).
Thus, on a social basis, the transfer offers
no net advantage.
The last column of table 1 presents the
social cost of various payment instru-
ments, ignoring float costs and bene-
fits. By this measure, the payor cost
per check is 79 cents, because float
benefits average 83 cents per check.
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Consequently, although the float nets
out, there is an indirect cost of 50 cents
if the payor writes a check rather than
initiating an ACH transaction. When
considering the total resources ex-
pended, cash and ACH are the least
costly options. The potential problem
that arises because of the divergence
between payor and social costs is dis-
cussed below.
• The Federal Reserve's Role:
Past and Present
The apparent ease and low resource cost
of making payments are the result of
many hidden technological and institu-
tional arrangements. Clearly, technology
is an essential component of any ad-
vanced payments system, but as the brief
history above demonstrates, institutional
arrangements cannot be ignored. To ex-
amine current institutional arrangements
in more detail, it is necessary to focus on
the Federal Reserve's role in the nation's
payments system.
Like the central banks of Europe and
Canada, the Federal Reserve is respon-
sible for setting monetary policy and
ensuring the stability and integrity of
the payments system. To varying ex-
tents, all of these institutions are also
providers of payment services. How-
ever, Europe and Canada tend to have
highly concentrated markets with rela-
tively few national financial institu-
tions, meaning that a large percentage
of payments can be processed inter-
nally. Consequently, these nations have
less need for a central authority to fa-
cilitate payments than does the United
States, with its thousands of financial
entities spread over 50 states.
The Federal Reserve was created in the
aftermath of the Panic of 1907, which
led to a clamor for a central bank that
could provide an "elastic currency" ca-
pable of preventing contractions in the
money stock when business turned
down. Another of its legislated goals
was to reduce the cost of payment serv-
ices. The establishment of the "gold
wire" (leased wire communications be-
tween the 12 Federal Reserve Banks)
allowed interbank balances to be set-
tled through book entry methods rather
than by shipping gold or currency or re-
lying on regional clearinghouses, as
was then common. Further, in allowing
member banks to transfer funds daily
over leased wire at minimal cost, do-
mestic exchange rates were eliminated.
Check processing fees were also re-
duced by banning nonpar checking
(charging by the dollar value of a check
rather than per item) and lowering the




Prior to 1981, the Federal Reserve pro-
vided wire transfers, check processing,
and ACH services to member banks
that held reserve balances, but it did
not explicitly charge for these services.
Nonmember banks contracted for simi-
lar services from private providers or
relied on correspondent relationships
with banks that were members of the
System. During this time, the Fed initi-
ated some significant innovations in
payments efficiency. The most notable
was the implementation of MICR (mag-
netic ink character recognition) encod-
ing in the late 1950s, which enabled
checks to be processed by high-speed
reader-sorters.
The Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA) drastically altered the
makeup of the payments system. Before
1981, the Federal Reserve's no-fee pol-
icy meant that it faced less competition
from the private sector for its member
bank customers. It offered a basic, no-
frills level of service, while a few pri-
vate, value-added providers (those of-
fering more rapid intercity collection or
more extensive processing) competed
wherever a profitable niche arose. Pri-
vate providers also encountered re-
duced competition for nonmember de-
pository institutions' business, since
the Fed did not actively pursue those
firms as customers. One of DIDMCA's
most important effects was to increase
the degree of competition in the market
for payment services.
DIDMCA required the Federal Reserve
to price its services explicitly and to make
them available to all U.S. depositories.
Over the long run, fees for payment serv-
ices must be set to recover all direct and
indirect costs, including "interest on items
credited prior to actual collection, over-
head, and an allocation of imputed costs
which takes into account the taxes that
would have been paid and the return on
capital that would have been provided
had the services been furnished by a pri-
vate business firm."
9 Thus, when the
Federal Reserve prices its services, return
on equity — currently set to equal the
average return earned by the nation's 50
largest bank holding companies — is
factored in.
DIDMCA has had a largely positive
effect on payment services, enhancing
competition and lowering unit costs
even while improving product quality.
Although the Federal Reserve lost about
25 percent of its check processing vol-
ume immediately after passage (ac-
counting for about half of its total reve-
nue), the initial loss from member banks
was more than offset by steady volume
gains from nonmember depositories.
• Future Challenges
New technology and institutional ar-
rangements require continual rework-
ing of the payments system. In general,
there are two ways to boost efficiency.
The first is to increase the productivity
of payment instruments wherever possi-
ble. A good example is the move to an
all-electronic ACH system, which was
completed at the end of June. Before
that, some volume was generated by
tapes and diskettes, which are expen-
sive to process. For paper checks, the
adoption of imaging — that is, creating
an electronic picture of all of a check's
components and then storing that infor-
mation electronically — may permit
even further cost savings.
The next phase in the evolution of the
payments system is to conduct each
step of a transaction (ordering, pay-
ment, and inventory) electronically via
ACH or financial electronic data inter-
change (EDI). Payors will benefit
through increased control of the timing
of payments and the receipt of funds,
more accurate record keeping, and po-
tentially lower costs. Although only ap-
propriate for business-to-business trans-
actions, financial EDI can replace paper
checks with a less expensive ACH
transaction and at the same time reduce
accounting costs for both the payor and
payee by tracking invoices and pay-
ments electronically. Unfortunately,
while such systems are now in place,
widespread usage will likely be delayed




The second strategy for improving pay-
ments system efficiency is to remove
the wedge between payor and social
costs caused by float. While it is true
that for large dollar payments and pay-
ments that occur frequently, the means
of payment will probably be negotiated
by the parties involved, this is not prac-
tical for most transactions. The 50-cent
social cost divergence between checks
and ACH items may sound inconse-
quential, but it adds up quickly given
the billions of transactions that occur in
the United States every year. If the
payee really wants to extend the payor
a no-cost loan over the float period,
both parties could agree to delay the
payment and split the savings.
Several strategies could be invoked to
reduce or eliminate float costs. In Can-
ada, banks have agreements among
themselves to backdate checks. The
United States has opted for speeding
up the check collection process by
transporting the physical checks faster
and by offering new services such as
electronic check truncation, which con-
verts a paper check to an ACH transac-
tion at the bank of first deposit.
In working toward a more efficient pay-
ments system, the Federal Reserve must
balance its competing roles. By acting
as the chief regulator of the payments
system and an active participant in the
market for payment services, the Fed
has a huge influence on the market. As
the central bank, it sometimes incurs
costs that a private provider of payment
services would not, potentially putting
itself at a competitive disadvantage.
For example, extended Fedwire hours
were instituted primarily to improve
settlement arrangements in the foreign
exchange markets. Though conflicts
will continue to emerge because of the
Fed's dual role, its active involvement
in providing payment services has
given central bankers a better under-
standing of the market—knowledge
that they can draw on to help ensure
the stability and integrity of the na-
tion's payments system.• Conclusion
Great strides have been made in im-
proving the productivity of the U.S.
payments system as technology has
taken us from goods to coins to paper
to electronics. But while technological
innovations are necessary, they are not
sufficient to ensure high performance
when the appropriate institutional ar-
rangements are lacking.
Technological and institutional changes
in the payments system continue to pre-
sent new challenges. One unavoidable
wrinkle is that the Federal Reserve has
central bank responsibilities, yet by law
must also act as just another private
provider of payment services. As a cen-
tral bank, the Fed is concerned with the
health of the banking system as a
whole, sometimes incurring costs that a
private provider would not and putting
itself at a disadvantage relative to its
private-sector competitors. It also un-
dertakes some actions that the private
sector does not, such as publishing a
price list and inviting public comment
on changes in its operating procedures.
On the other hand, the Fed's dual role
does generate some social benefit by
enhancing the monetary authorities'
knowledge of the payments system.
The move to electronic payments, inter-
state banking, and bank consolidation,
coupled with the entry of new competi-
tors into the payment services market,
offers the promise of a more efficient
payments system, but it also requires
the Federal Reserve to reconsider the
way in which it operates." By taking
an active role in providing payment
services, the Fed is acquiring experi-
ence that should help it in that task.
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